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THE IMAGINATION IN WUNDT'S TREATMENT OF  
MYTH AND RELIGION.<sup>1</sup>

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Two years ago,<sup>2</sup> the writer called attention to the importance of the task which Wundt has set himself in these later years of his scientific activity. It is the task of interpreting the development of the products and processes of human society in terms of the psychological standpoint which he has rendered definite and commanding through a lifetime of arduous labors. Those first results appeared in the two parts of the first volume of his *Völkerpsychologie*, and dealt with the highly complex and illusive processes of speech and their products, preserved for us in language. Apart from the decisive advance which the substitution of a modern psychology for the Herbartian, which has persisted in philology and education, brings with it, we pointed out the searching test to which this undertaking subjected the concepts and categories of the Wundtian psychology. In particular there arose in the consideration of the problems of language an opposition between the structural contents which were assumed to be given and the associative and especially the apperceptive processes by which these were organized into cognizable wholes.

The difficulty, however, did not reach such definite proportions in the treatment of language as those which it assumes in the last volume which Professor Wundt has recently published — the first half of the second volume of his *Völkerpsychologie* — which deals with Myth and Religion. One has, to be sure, in reading this volume the same sense of a mind moving easily and surely within a vast labyrinth of material, because it possesses a clue enabling it to pass comprehend-

<sup>1</sup> This number, dealing especially with social psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor J. H. Tufts.

<sup>2</sup> PSYCHOL. BULLETIN, Vol. I., No. 11.

ingly wherever it will. Whatever conclusion the reader may come to touching the adequacy of his account from the point of view of psychological theory, he cannot for a moment question the control over this enormous field which a consistent psychological standpoint gives. It is not only that generalizations are possible which the anthropologist and sociologist have not succeeded in making, but that these generalizations order not only the material but also the innumerable theories which have dealt with it in the past.

Wundt's fundamental position is that the mental processes, which have given rise to myths and the constructive art that has embodied them, are quite identical with the immediate processes of sense-perception as they have existed among primitive peoples, as they exist among such peoples to-day, and as they exist in the most reflective communities. The difference lies in the fact that our reflection checks and criticises an apperception which otherwise would animate nature and its objects for us, as it has for all communities before reflective consciousness becomes dominant. The common defect therefore in all the theories which have been offered in explanation of rise of myths—the symbolistic, the rationalistic, the analogical, the importation, the illusion, and the suggestion theories—is that they have one and all assumed that myths existed in the minds of primitive peoples as explanations of various phenomena, such as life and death, the change of the seasons, growth and decay, etc., when in reality dream figures and ghosts, personified animals, plants and inorganic things, were the direct apperceptions of uncritical natures. And the specific task which Wundt undertakes is that of so analyzing impression, association, and apperception that we shall see only a difference in degree between our affective presentations of natural objects and the 'personifications' thereof by more primitive men. The phase of the perceptive process which affords the material for this interpretation, is the imaginative. Phantasy or imagination is at work in all our perceptions, filling in the outlines and incomplete presentations of the senses, enriching our associations especially with feeling-contents, and finally projecting us into the objects of our apperception, through the merging of objective data of the sense-process and the subjective reaction thereto in an indissoluble whole. This does not imply of course that imagination is a separate faculty or power. "This activity of the imagination is nothing which is added to the other conscious processes as a field of specific phenomena or as the expression of a separate power, but is simply an expression for the mental processes in general, when these are viewed from the point of view of the interaction of outer impressions with the

cf. P. 194

traces of former experiences, and under the peculiar condition that the results, arising from this interaction, arouse feelings and emotions, which the perceiving subject projects into the objects, while they are still experienced as subjective excitations. This process accompanies in a certain degree all contents of consciousness, since there are none in which direct and reproductive elements do not coöperate in stronger or weaker affective reactions. The activity of the imagination, therefore, is simply an enhancing of these normal functions, taking place under favorable circumstances. In the same fashion we may add that the mythological imagination is no mental power, formerly present and now lost, but it is in its whole nature identical with imagination in general."<sup>1</sup> In this sense Wundt analyzes the imagination as it appears in spatial perception, in temporal perception, in the contents of its images, in childhood, and finally in art. It is in the æsthetic consciousness that it finds its most characteristic expression, and our introspective presentation of it he identifies with the 'feeling-in' (*Ein-fühlen*) which has become so common a term in modern psychological æsthetics. "The 'feeling-in' is supposed to make comprehensible on the one side the effect of the impression on the affective consciousness (*Gemüt*) of the observer, and on the other the immediate relation of the subjective excitation of the feelings to the object. 'Feeling-in,' in this sense, in the nature of the case is no process that is confined to æsthetic objects, but forms a necessary coefficient of every possible presentation, whether this is a so-called perception or an image of the fancy. In its psychological nature this 'feeling-in' is the part of the assimilation-process involved in the formation of every presentation, which lies upon the affective side. It is in so far a double-sided assimilation of the feelings, as the motives to association that are bound up with the objective impression are inseparably merged with those subjective motives which spring from the immediate reaction of the impression upon the body itself, its volitional activities, and the associated feelings."<sup>2</sup> The importance of this identification for Wundt's theory is evident when we read in the chapter dealing with Mythological Apperception: "Thus the mythological personification is only a heightened degree of all those processes, which one has termed 'feeling-in' in the analysis of æsthetic effects. The æsthetic feeling-in is nothing else than a reduced form of mythological personification, and this itself is the æsthetic feeling in its highest degree, where the whole personality, in its momentary state of consciousness together with the

<sup>1</sup> *Völkerpsy.*, 2. Bd., 1. Abt., p. 579; cf. Chap. I.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 42.

after effects of former experiences that enter into it, passes over into the object. As æsthetic feeling-in and mythological personification are different only in degree and not in essence, so they are both, finally, only modifications of a more general function, without which the object, which both the æsthetic as well as the myth-building phantasy imply, would not exist for our consciousness, *i. e.*, apperception."<sup>1</sup> This animating (*belebende*) apperceptive process looked at from the point of view of the heightened activity of the imagination Wundt considers his first principle in the psychological explanation of the social phenomena which are included under the rubric of Myth and Religion. The second principle he denominates 'the feeling-enhancing power of illusion.' We shall presumably hear more of this second principle in the second part of this volume where the phenomena of religion, it is to be supposed, will be dealt with more particularly. Only so much needs to be emphasized in reference to this second principle, that, in the structures of imagination, it is the subjective rather than the objective factors which give determining affective moments to the impression, so that it is with the increase of this factor of the imagination that the increase of the emotional effect of the impression goes hand in hand.<sup>2</sup> It is perhaps hardly necessary to call attention to the fact that these factors are the feelings, in the sense in which Wundt has finally defined them in the last editions of his *Grundrisse*, and the *Physiologische Psychologie*; that is, contents of consciousness which have not only the attributes of pleasantness and unpleasantness, but also those of excitement and depression, and of strain and relaxation. These contents cover, therefore, what other psychologists have ascribed to our kinæsthetic sensations. I wish to call especial attention to this value which feeling has for the author, because of its important result in the psychological interpretation of myths and religions. For these feeling-contents are not confined to the field of this second principle, but play perhaps as important a part in the interpretation of the animating apperception. Wundt points out that the content of our images is only in a small degree what comes through the objective sense-processes. It is possible for a nonvisualizer to have vivid imagery that has to do with objects which are sensed by the eye and the hand. Where he does not depend upon the visual and tactual contents, according to the author, their place is taken by the feelings. The result of this use of the term is that what may be presented in terms of the kinæsthetic sensations has for Wundt the peculiarly subjective character that goes

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 579, 580.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.



with the affective phases of consciousness. It has not only this; it has practically the static value which these phases possess, which is in crying contradiction with the kinæsthetic contents which they are called upon to represent.

In insisting upon this latter point I have reference not so much to the presentation which Wundt makes of the feelings in his works on individual psychology as to the results which appear in his treatment of the constructions of the imagination, especially in dealing with the art of children and primitive peoples.

One other characteristic Wundtian category should be referred to before a final estimate of his interpretation of these social phenomena is presented. I refer to apperception. In discussing impression, association, and apperception, the author says: "These concepts indicate at bottom only one and the same process, that is viewed each time from another side: as impressions, when we attend especially to those associations which subsist between the elements which have just entered consciousness; as associations in the narrower sense, when we consider the relations of these elements with the multiform former experiences of the same conscious individual; and finally as apperception, when we emphasize the comprehension of all these factors in a resulting conscious function. As little as there is ever an impression which does not contain numerous associations, so little is there any association-process which does not order itself under a result that includes all the associations of objective and subjective elements, of which the immediate state of consciousness consists."<sup>1</sup> And finally: "That power of these associations includes as well, and as essential factors, those associations which build themselves up between the feeling and volitional impulses and the objective contents of consciousness. The resulting effects of these blendings and assimilations of both elements is apperception, which is for this reason the most unitary function of consciousness, comprehending all other mental processes."<sup>2</sup> Here we have apperception — the organizing function of consciousness — stated in terms of association, not association interpreted in terms of apperception. The actual use of this conception results in the explanation of all conscious activities in terms of elements already there with their associations determined by the structure arising out of past experience, plus the immediate experience. Of course the value — the meaning — of this immediate experience must come in terms of the associations already worked into the warp and woof of consciousness. In other

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 589.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 588.

words, the only direction which consciousness finds lies in the associations already present. There is no hint that among an indefinite number of such associations there may be selection, determined by the activity which is going on. And yet this is just what introspection reveals to us, an organized group of associations arising in response to the demands of the particular situation within which we find ourselves. In this treatise Wundt regards apperception as a simple necessity that lies upon all our associations of appearing in unitary wholes, not as the directing and controlling action of consciousness selecting these associations. The actual apperceptions are explained in terms of existing associations and not vice versa.

Now it is evident that these two concepts, that of feeling and that of apperception, go hand in hand. The sense of active direction which introspection reveals attaches itself to kinæsthetic experience, and in proportion as we substitute structural contents of feeling for these kinæsthetic contents in that proportion do we rob consciousness of explicit direction.

Returning now to the problems which Wundt has undertaken to solve, we find him accounting for every product of the mythological imagination as a work of art that finds its *raison d'être* and its attraction for the social group in the feeling contents, and the æsthetic response thereto (Einfühlen). He follows out in a remarkably clear analysis the development of ideal art through the stages of momentary, memory, decorative and imitative art. In every case he affirms that the constructive act arises in response to an outer stimulus, and the value of this stimulus lies in the feeling content which it possesses. One seeks an object that will be a more admirable carrier for this feeling content. In incidental art it is but a passing impulse, which may come under the impulse to communicate and so this art tends to pass into the class of language expression. Memory may be influenced, in part, by the thought of the lasting character of the presentation, but this is not the immediate ground of its construction. Decorative art arises through the associations of the form of the utilitarian object or its markings with animals and men. In personal decoration at first the terrifying effects of tattooing and markings may be present, but Wundt presents it as a production which simply calls forth a feeling, as if there were a natural passage from the feeling to that which produces it, apart from the valuable effect that this might have in battle. In every case the psychological account of the appearance of the product is found in the relation of the feeling content to the artistic construction of the object. It is only secondarily that it may be selected to perform certain functions

with the social group. Finally, out of the control which the primitive artist has obtained over the material and technique arises the possibility of the free expression of those objects in nature which are the carriers of his affective reactions, and from this, through the emphasis upon the characteristics which call forth feelings, he advances to the construction of works of art which are the embodiment of his ideas and serve to set free those affective contents which are seeking expression. We find a similar analysis in the psychological development of the so-called musical arts, dance and music, leading on to the song, the epic, and the drama. Finally, in the discussion of the mythological imagination we meet the generalization of his interpretation which has been already given at the beginning of this paper.

It would be difficult to convince one who approached without psychological presuppositions the history of primitive art and mythology, that the functions which the early products of a constructive imagination fulfilled in the social life of the group did not determine the psychological growth of the products themselves, that the function which the æsthetic image had in the social consciousness was not active until the product arose in response to the simple demand for a carrier of the feelings, that the selection which must have been responsible for their preservation had nothing to do with the inner activities by which they were produced; and yet this seems to me the logical result of Wundt's analysis. In a word, for him, the æsthetic image, whether existing simply in the mind or embodied in an outer form, has no function beyond that of responding to and heightening the affective experience. If such a statement seems an adequate psychological interpretation of the ideal artist and his creations it certainly breaks down when applied to primitive art.

## WESTERMARCK ON THE ORIGIN OF MORAL IDEAS.<sup>1</sup>

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Dr. Westermarck's massive work, of which the first volume has appeared, has two main divisions. On the one hand the origin of moral ideas and moral judgments is sought in the emotions; on the other the phenomena which among different peoples and in different ages have had a tendency to call forth moral blame and moral praise are examined.

Moral ideas, according to the author, who follows a well-known line of British tradition, are based on emotions of indignation or approval. The moral concepts are essentially 'generalization of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions.' The apparent objectivity implied in moral judgments is not due to their rational character but to 'the comparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness.' Custom has made men feel alike. 'Public indignation and public approval are the prototypes of the moral emotions.' Intellectual considerations have an important influence in the development of the moral consciousness from the unenlightened to the enlightened, but as the emotional constitutions of man differ there will always be ultimate differences in judgments.

As regards their nature, the moral emotions belong to the general class of retributive emotions. They are distinguished from other retributive emotions by their 'disinterestedness,' 'apparent impartiality,' and 'a certain flavor of generality.' Waiving for the present the question as to the adequacy of this analysis, the interesting point for social psychology is then, What are the sources of these distinguishing qualities?

Sympathy due to association, sympathy with 'the coöperation of the altruistic sentiment or affection,' sympathy as contagious emotion, disinterested antipathies of a more or less æsthetic sort and the corresponding sympathetic approvals, explain the disinterestedness. The 'apparent impartiality' and 'flavor of generality' are derived, on the

<sup>1</sup>*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.* By EDWARD WESTERMARCK, Ph.D. In two volumes. New York, The Macmillan Co. Vol. I., 1906, pp. xxi + 716.



other hand, from the influence of custom. "The most salient feature of custom is its generality. Its transgression calls forth public opinion; hence the flavor of generality which characterizes moral disapproval." 'Apparent impartiality' has its root here also, and disinterestedness receives reinforcement.

The further question now presents itself. Is the essential moral aspect of the emotion its relation to custom, or is it its public character? Is moral = habitual (non-habitual), or is it = public? Does the morality depend on the customary, or does the customary have some other element than its habitual character, and is it this which is regarded as moral? Westermarck decides for the latter alternation. "Custom is a moral rule only on account of the indignation called forth by its transgression. In its ethical aspect it is nothing but a generalization of emotional tendencies applied to certain modes of conduct and transmitted from generation to generation" (Chap. V.). Apparently, therefore, the 'apparent impartiality' and 'flavor of generality' do not enter as integrant elements into a complex moral emotion which gets its moral value only because of these and other additions. Rather, custom adds these elements to emotions already moral if they are (*a*) retributive and (*b*) public.

But what on this view are we to understand by 'recognizing the validity of a custom?' (p. 120). "By recognizing the validity of a custom, I implicitly admit that the custom is equally binding for me and for you and for all the members of a society." This must on the above theory logically mean: By recognizing that a custom calls out public indignation, I admit that it calls out equally my indignation and yours and that of all the rest, *i. e.*, by recognizing it as general I recognize it as general.

There is of course one condition under which this sentence ceases to be tautology, namely, if we make a distinction between the 'indignation of all' and 'public indignation,' similar to that in Rousseau's *volonté de tous* and *volonté générale*. But this involves a reconstruction of the whole theory of the moral emotions. If we take the emotions in their primitive reaction they are nearly if not quite coördinate with the instincts. They are as social, as general, as the instincts bred in by the struggle for individual and group existence. If we take resentment for illustration, there is no doubt a resentment of group injury among animals which is purely instinctive, just as there is individual instinctive resentment. But *as such*, it would seem unnecessary to point out if such a well-read author did not seem to ignore it, one is no more moral in the proper sense than is the other. Only when

there is some conscious comparison, some voluntary choice, do we have moral emotion. But when we reach this stage the emotion is no longer what it was. Its thrill and tension are no doubt primitive, but the self whose purpose now overflows in emotion, the self whose struggling conations are appreciated in the tension of duty, is now another self. 'Righteous indignation' may get its flame from the fires of individual and race antagonisms; it becomes righteous only in view of a system of ideal and social ends. The good of the group must be present not only instinctively but consciously; the emotion of purity must be more than instinctive repulsion by the female, or instinctive jealousy in the male. It is right, I think, to find the antecedents, the roots of morality in the instincts, impulses, and attendant emotions; it is an inadequate psychology to set off the emotions as a set of phenomena apart by themselves and base moral judgments upon them.

The latter division, including both a general survey of the general characteristics of responsible action and a detailed account of particular modes of conduct which are praised or blamed, occupies the larger part of the work and is the most valuable portion. It contains an enormous amount of material as to primitive views of conduct, arranged under six topics: (1) acts, forbearances, and omissions that directly concern the interests of others; (2) those that concern the man's own welfare; (3) sexual relations; (4), (5) and (6) conduct toward lower animals, toward the dead, and toward supernatural beings, real or imaginary. There is an effort in the treatment of this material to do more than merely record the various usages on the hit-or-miss, crazy-quilt fashion which has become almost a sacred style for anthropological material. There is some attempt at interpretation of the material presented. For example, in the chapter on Hospitality the effort is made to explain the seeming contradiction between the limited social bond of the group and hospitality shown to strangers. The view presented, which is more clearly worked out by the author in a paper read before the Sociological Society and printed in their *Sociological Papers*, Volume II., is that this is due to the supposed magical efficacy of the stranger in bringing good luck or a curse, the food acting as the medium of communication for the magic influence.

Probably a book on the plan of the present work is the necessary book at this stage. And yet it serves to emphasize very forcibly the need of another book which shall use the materials in another way,—a book which shall not only describe the customs and laws of various peoples, at different times, concerning life, property, sex, and the

other world, but also enable the reader to grasp as a whole the developing spirit which is disclosed in all these diverse methods of control and approvals. We need a fuller relation of the moral to the economic and industrial conditions. We need to see more fully why there has been advance in some cases and not in others. For such a work the materials are rapidly accumulating, and the methods by which they may be interpreted are becoming clear.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

### GENERAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

*Instituts Solvay. Institut de Sociologie. Notes et Mémoires.* Librairie Misch & Thron, Brussels.

1. *Note sur les formules d'introduction à l'énergétique physio- et psycho-sociologique.* E. SOLVAY. 1906. Pp. 24. Fr. 2.
2. *Esquisse d'une sociologie.* E. WAXWEILER. 1906. Pp. 306. Fr. 12.
3. *Les origines naturelles de la propriété.* R. PETRUCCI. 1905. Pp. 246. Fr. 12.
4. *Sur quelques erreurs de méthode dans l'étude de l'homme primitif.* L. WODON. 1906. Pp. 37. Fr. 2.50.
5. *L'Aryen et l'anthroposociologie.* E. HOUZÉ. 1906. Pp. 177. Fr. 6.
6. *Mesure des capacités intellectuelle et énergétique.* CH. HENRY. Avec une remarque additionnelle: *Sur l'interprétation sociologique de la distribution des salaires.* E. WAXWEILER. 1906. Pp. 75. Fr. 4.
7. *Origine polyphylétique, homotypie, et non-comparabilité des sociétés animales.* R. PETRUCCI. 1906. Pp. 126. Fr. 5.

The *Solvay Institut de Sociologie*, founded in 1902 by M. Ernest Solvay and situated in Brussels, puts forward the above evidences of vigorous production by the Director, Emile Waxweiler, his collaborators, and others. Several of the various monographs have a certain community of point of view. The effort is made to relate social phenomena in man to corresponding phases of animal life, and in method to find at least a starting point in general biological conceptions. The first brochure, by M. Solvay, founder of the institute, is however of a mathematical character.

The numbers which are of interest from the standpoint of social psychology are (2), (3), (4) and (7).

In (2), *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*, the author finds his point of view in the conception of Ethology. This term is taken, not in Mill's sense of science of character, but in the sense for which the term Ecology is also employed, to designate a study of organisms in relation to environment. Disregarding the relation of the individual to his cosmic environment, the sociologist notes among the relations to the



living environment those involved in the facts of species. These facts may be considered as including a threefold specific affinity: sexual, which implies fecundity limited by the species; vegetative, which determines the relations of cells derived by auto-division from another cell, whether these form cell-colonies or a single organism; and social, which leads the individual to establish relations with others in which it finds similarity of organization. Specific affinity may be defined as 'a particular aspect of the physical sensibility, which renders it susceptible of responding, in determinate conditions, to excitation from the other individuals of the same species.' Social affinity will be such a sensibility as 'renders an organism susceptible to the excitations of other individuals of the same species without distinction of sex,' and this is the fundamental fact for sociology. This is similar to the 'like response' which Giddings makes the basis for the 'consciousness of kind,' but the author regards it as more fundamental, since it might exist without there necessarily being a like response. It has also the decided advantage that it centers emphasis upon the interdependent relation rather than upon a perception of similarity. Sociology may then be called "the science of the phenomena of reaction due to the mutual excitation of individuals of the same species without distinction of sex."

The analysis of these phenomena of social affinity which occupies the larger part of the volume is sketched in outline, rather than worked out in detail, and seems hardly as fruitful as the central conception would lead the reader to expect.

In the third monograph M. Petrucci has given a very instructive study of the relation of property to the individual and to the group—family, clan, or people. Instead of the abstract discussions often found as to private or group ownership, we have an effort to relate forms of property to biological and psychological conditions. It is thus in some respects correlative to the admirable study made some years ago by Grosse of the relation of the various forms of the family to economical and industrial conditions.

Premising that individual and collective possession have their roots in the two fundamental sets of instincts, those for individual needs of support, attack, defense and protection, and those for the maintenance of the species and its interests, the author is led to examine the sub-human manifestations of these instincts and the forms of possession, if not of property in the full legal and moral sense, which arise from them. Even plants show the two forces at work in their methods of exploiting the soil and storing nutritive reserves. Mollusks and worms

show predominantly individual types; the corals, however, afford an interesting example of colonial structure, with individual tubes, joined by transverse supports. Insects, of course, furnish in the ants and bees the extreme evolution of collective property where certain members are employed as store-houses for nutriment. Birds with their family life have in their nest a family property, although the social species in their exploited territory assert a collective rather than an individual or family control, and some of them in their nesting colonies have rather group than family nests. And on the other hand, in some species individuals have their own permanent dwellings. The three types, individual, family, and group property, are thus all foreshadowed in bird life, and mammals repeat these three types with various degrees of emphasis.

The principal factor which marks property among primitive man, as in any way distinct from the animal types, is the making and use of permanent tools and arms and clothing. These maintain their individual character. Family property is more likely to appear in the dwelling, and group or collective property in the territory exploited, although we find here also collective property in dwellings, and on the other hand in some cases families exploiting each its own territory. No such extreme of collectivism as that among the hymenoptera appears in human societies.

The analogies found show therefore that the social fact (in this case, the fact of property) is not bound up with the biological evolution in such a way that the biological perfecting gives at the same time the social laws (p. 218). The phenomena of property may be summarized in the following six principles: (1) Property appears as a phenomenon attaching to the first manifestations of life. (2) It is at first the expression of an individual structure and an adaptation. It takes (3) the individual form when it is determined by the biological law of the protection of the individual; (4) the family form when determined by the law of protection of the species, realized on the basis of the sex instinct; (5) the collective form when determined by the law of protection of the species, realized by the phenomena of association, considered generally and abstracting from the family group. (6) The individual, family and collective forms of property are specifically distinct, and are characterized respectively, (*a*) by reflecting the proper structure and activities of the animal considered in isolation; (*b*) by the predominance of the associative tendency limited by the parental group, (*c*) by the unrestricted predominance of the associative tendency. An excellent chart shows the facts with reference to the three

kinds of property in the three cases of food reserves, exploitation of territory, shelter and dwelling.

The 'errors of method in the study of primitive man,' to which M. Wodon's discussion is devoted, are those committed in the author's opinion by Karl Bücher. The doctrine of a non-industrial and non-economic primitive condition, the doctrine of the differentiation of the work of the sexes, and the view that play and art precede serious production are criticized. The postulate that dispositions or modes of conduct which do not harmonize with the conditions of life at a given stage may be regarded as survivals of a previous stage and therefore used as data from which to construct that previous stage, is easily shown to be unsound. There is not, however, an adequately supported discussion of the views presented in opposition to those of Bücher.

In the seventh number of the series M. Petrucci examines the various types of social life among animals with the purpose of discovering (1) whether these forms can be regarded as forming a linear series of development, corresponding in evolution to the biological 'higher' and 'lower'; (2) how much of the human social instinct may be regarded as hereditary. These questions involve, moreover, (3) some suggestive queries as to how far certain peculiarities of human societies found in tabus, in totem groups, in separation of groups of unmarried males, etc., are really as purely instinctive and without rational explanation for their origin as are the corresponding phenomena among animals.

The conclusions under (1) and (2) may be briefly stated. The social forms of animal life cannot be arranged in a serial order of lower and higher corresponding to biological development; they are of polyphyletic origin. The successive appearance of similar forms is homotypic, not hereditary. The only hereditary factor is the tendency to group. But this takes on the form of maternal societies, or of paternal groups, of polygamous or monogamous groups, of flocks or colonies, not by any single serial law, but under the stimuli of varying circumstances, such as those of supply, defense, migration, or mating, and the care of young.

Some of the problems suggested under (3) are the following: We find among primitive peoples such facts as the separation of the adolescent into classes or groups apart from the families, or again the separation of males and females into distinct bands. These phenomena are found also among various animals. Woman in pregnancy is frequently regarded as unclean, and is among some peoples isolated. The isolation of females at the season of pregnancy is observed among rumi-

nants and birds. The aged females occupy a dominant position in many animal and human societies. We cannot say that these specific customs are inherited by man from the animal species which have them. The instances that crop out along various branches of the biological tree are not found in a consecutive line. But, on the other hand, does not the homotypy suggest strongly a similar cause? It wears now among human societies the appearance of religious custom. "The truth is that with man, as with the animal, the fact may depend on many other causes. The explanations given are constructed after the phenomena; they should be rejected. I confess, for my part, that the real cause remains for me unknown. I do not even see how investigation should be directed in order to discuss it." In the case of æsthetic phenomena the author draws a conclusion adverse to their alleged social origin. The bird decorates the bower; the primitive man decorates his cave with shining objects or gathers a store of bright stones. Sometimes this serves sexual ends, sometimes it merely affords pleasant sensations. "The æsthetic phenomenon is in nowise social in its origins; like property it is a something brought by the individual animal to the group to which he joins himself as integrant part. It becomes social with him; it is not such by its proper nature or by its origins." On this three comments may be made. (1) M. Petrucci draws very sweeping inductions from data in a single art. Song, music, dance, myth, story, are not reckoned with. (2) Few if any advocates of the social origin of art would wish to maintain this in a sense that excludes sex relationship from social factors. (3) What the present writer, for example, has maintained is, not that man as individual has not sensations pleasantly stimulated by color, sound, smell, and touch, nor that he does not adorn his person to provoke the passions of sex. It is rather that the detachment and the objectivity characteristic of the æsthetic, as compared with appetite and passion, is strongly aided if not entirely caused by the social as *versus* the individual attitude; and further that in the profounder æsthetic consciousness the idea of expression, of communication, of sharing, is an important factor.

J. H. T.

*L'échange économique et l'échange affectif.* F. PAULHAN. *Revue Philosophique*, 1906, LXII., 358-399.

The chief difference, as found by the author, between the economic exchange and the exchange of feeling, lies in the definite character of the one and the vague, indefinite nature of the other. In the economic exchange, the values are easily appreciable in numbers, the obligation is fulfilled by one act of a highly specialized kind. On the



other hand, the idea of measuring the value of a friendship has in it something repugnant. Neither is its obligation fulfilled by the return of a favor; it implies a promise of future acts and a complex variety of services. It therefore engages more of the personality. It is, however, always an exchange. The mother gives affection and care; but the child furnishes a soft, lovable object on which to expend devotion — a real exchange, since it gives pleasure to the mother. The exchange of feeling is also a real exchange in the sense that it implies a real obligation, failure to fulfill which, as in ingratitude, is censured as dishonesty would

The two spheres are not after all wholly dissimilar. Money has an influence on health, on fame, on pleasure, even on the procuring of affection. It is not the sole cause, but may provide fostering conditions. One dislikes to consider a friendship in economic terms, yet many people would give up some friendships for the sake of a fortune. It is even possible that a legacy may deaden the grief at the loss of a parent. And friendships which seem to us beyond price may be measured in terms of other friendships, which in turn may be valued in money. Moreover, feeling comes to play a large part in economic exchange, particularly in small towns. Especially is one's feeling towards the social conditions of one's country affected by countless small economic exchanges.

The economic exchange corresponds to greater specialization and a more advanced organization of society. Hence, in times of peace and prosperity exchange tends to become more exact and less influenced by feeling. This is true even in personal relations of friendship; the greatest harmony results only when each knows exactly what he may expect from the other. Until this is attained, there is always danger of misunderstanding. The economic exchange therefore represents, when completely reached, the highest advance of which a given organization is capable. On the other hand, any sudden crisis tends to recall the exchange of feeling. A man who objects to what he considers excessive taxes, will die for his country in time of war. The activity of feeling indicates a period of stress, of disorganized life, and marks the beginning of a new progress. It corresponds to invention and will and all phenomena in which automatic routine is broken. When the stress is over, the new life immediately begins to organize itself along lines of economic exchange.

The change here is not from altruism toward egoism. Altruism and egoism only exist where there is a conflict of desires. In the pure economic exchange, both parties are absolutely satisfied. The

purchase of a postage stamp is an act neither of egoism or altruism; it is rather a suppression of both. It is in the same way a suppression of what are usually termed moral considerations, in favor of considerations of utility.

Each kind of exchange supplements the other; both are modes of progress. The economic exchange marks the end evolution in a particular system; the exchange of feeling enlarges and transforms the system, which the economic exchange again proceeds to regulate. This account is, however, only schematically correct. In reality, the two sorts of exchanges are infinitely complicated and intertwined one with another and an absolutely defined sequence, such as has been indicated, is perhaps never found.

A. L. STRONG.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

*Nature et Société.* S. JANKÉLÉVITCH. Paris, 1906. Pp. 188.

For M. Jankélévitch the particular social sciences may furnish the data for sociology, but are useless unless permeated by notions of unity and interdependence drained from sociology considered as their philosophic source. This position he holds as a criticism of the naturalistic sociology developed through Spencer, Marx and Durkheim.

The author first marks off what he styles natural from social phenomena. The first deal with judgments of existence; the second with judgments of value. Sociology, since it has to reckon with these judgments of value, contains a peculiarly human element which vitiates conclusions of the statistical method applied to social phenomena. After a brief historical sketch of the application of the conception of evolution to sociological studies, we find the author's criticism of the naturalistic sociology which arose from this application. To him social development is partly conditioned by environment, because this development is the result of man's reaction on this environment, but the element in the situation by virtue of which development occurs is the human will. Since every reaction is thus a unique synthesis, one term of which is the human will, sociological laws cannot be discovered as are natural laws. Having pointed out what he feels to be the peculiarity of social phenomena, he is prepared to give a definition of society. Society is organization for defense against external nature. This organization, however, cannot have its origin in biological forces, because these lead not to organization, but to struggle and disunion. Not finding its source in biological forces this organization must have its origin in man as a "conscious being capable of opposing his desires and needs to the action of natural forces" (p. 137). It is need-

less to point out the question-begging in this argument. To support this definition of society M. Jankélévitch devotes his last chapter to a consideration of the moral consciousness of the individual. The chief element of this is the activity of the will. Moral ideals are not merely reflections of environment, but expressions of the attitude of the individual. Every act of approbation or disapprobation, *e. g.*, the disapprobation of other theories by naturalistic sociologists, is an expression of this individuality. Thus the chief thesis of the book is the affirmation of the fact of individual initiative both in the moral experience of each member of society and in the relation of society to external nature.

The psychological experience of every man, M. Jankélévitch admits, is affected by the environment in which each man finds himself, but the author is so busy asserting that the chief factor in this experience is the individual will that he gives no suggestion as to the details of this response. The nearest he comes to it is in the last half dozen pages, where he emphasizes the variability of human nature. If, moreover, we take the work on its own ground, it seems to miss much of the point of positivistic sociology, despite its valid criticisms of that view. Freely granting that in moral experience there are unique elements not reducible to laws strictly analogous to those of biology, this does not compel us to deny that the category of causality applies to these phenomena or to adopt M. Jankélévitch's 'category of action' (p. 168). To deny that one type of laws expresses a given group of phenomena does not prevent us from seeking unity for these phenomena under a different type of *laws*, in case we happen to be hungry for unity. Value judgments are not necessarily taboo for empirical investigation if we wish to bring them also under a causal system of linkage.

ROWLAND HAYNES.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

#### RELIGION.

*The Philosophy of Religion.* GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Scribners, 1905. 2 vols.; pp. 616, 590.

This statement summarizes some discussions in the first volume dealing with psychological and social aspects of religion. The standpoint of the author is that there is a distinct, radical difference between the psychology and the philosophy of religion. Anthropology, comparative religion and psychology furnish important material for the use of philosophy, but the latter is a separate sphere. The peculiar element in religion which requires more than a scientific treatment is

the 'ontological consciousness.' This appears in the lowest known forms of human life and it is the mark which distinguishes man from the lower animals. Religion is universal because all men are religious! (P. 128.) Not only is it observed that all men have some religious belief and form of religious cult, but the "great religious ideas and truths lie everywhere dormant, or rather vital but undeveloped, in the lower strata of human religious life" (p. 126).

The treatment of the origin of religion proceeds from this presupposition. It is impossible to reduce the earliest forms of religion to anything more ultimate than a 'vague and unreflecting Spiritism.' This term does not designate a definite species of religious beliefs and practices, but the pervasive 'spiritizing tendency' found in every form of so-called primitive religion. Shamanism, Fetishism, Totemism, Theriolatry and Magic are only different manifestations of spiritism. None of the claims that any one of these is the original form can be substantiated (p. 92). It is impossible to know anything about 'primitive man' for he is a 'pure fiction.' In its earliest historical forms religion appears 'as an endowment or possession rather than as an evolution or new achievement.' It is forever impossible to discover when and how man began to be religious (p. 150). Slight consideration is given the theory that religion originated in ceremonials and rites. Such practices may indeed change from a non-religious to a religious character and the reverse, but this is no account of the origin of religious ideas themselves. "The fact, in most of these cases, is either that the rites themselves were originally derived from religious ideas; or else that, having some utilitarian or social origin, they have become incidentally connected with religious ideas, as all forms of social expression are ever ready to become" (p. 141).

Religion originates in the religious nature of man, and "it is man in his entirety, who is the maker of religion." "Without his metaphysical nature, his ontological consciousness, man would neither be scientific nor religious." "The lower impulsive and emotional stirrings solicit or impel him to be religious. His social instincts or more intelligent social desires and aims coöperate in the same results" (p. 263). The variations in religions are due in part to the variations in the psychical life of individuals and of the race, and also to the physical environment. Among the impulses involved in this psychical life are mentioned self-preservation, fear, dependence, altruistic and social feelings and intellectual curiosity. The social feelings are 'called forth' by worship of ancestors and the tribal gods. The communal feast is a prominent factor also. The sexual emotion of love, however,



does not become a source of religion or develop into a truly religious love (p. 292). "The erotic emotions, even in their most mystical and disguised form, have tended rather in the direction of degradation than of elevation" (p. 296). On the side of the physical environment the evidence is clear. "A tiger-god cannot exist where there are no tigers; nor can the palm claim worship where it is not known as a significant form of plant life" (p. 165). Where storms are impressive and practically important there storm-gods are found. Clan-gods are superseded by tutelary or local divinities when the nomadic clans settle in a particular locality. Changes of the social and political order also combine with geographical and ethnographical conditions to produce variation. The conceptions of the deities are often determined by the organization of the family, the divinity being a god or goddess according as descent is reckoned through the father or the mother (pp. 165 ff).

The relation of religion to industry, politics, science, art and morality is that of the most complex interaction. They are all made by man, 'they are the constructions of his active Self-hood' (p. 374). These reactions seem, however, to be conceived as more or less external and superficial. For example, the celebration, as religious festivities, of the various processes and stages of agriculture — the ploughing of the fields, the sowing of the seed, the harvest-home, the gathering of the vintage — 'imparts courage and cheerfulness to this form of human industry' (p. 395). Or religion, by inspiring and fostering a contempt for wealth, may discourage or greatly restrict the industrial development of any community. The distinctions between religion and politics, which become clear in developed society, seem to be read back into the earliest stages of human life, and their essential identity is described as a 'subtle, profound' relation (p. 398). The same impression is made by the discussion of the relation of art and religion and of morality and religion. They are discussed with reference to the manner in which both employ the creative imagination, share certain forms of feeling and employ intuitive processes. "Morality and religion are psychologically united so that they can never exist apart, and yet are not to be identified" (p. 460).

In the treatment of 'The Religious Community' the *a priori* and ontological conception of the religious principle becomes particularly conspicuous. Here, if anywhere, one would expect to find the recognition of the vital relation of the religious and the social consciousness. It is rather surprising, therefore, to read that the religious community proceeds 'as a spontaneous yet logical process from the religious belief itself' (p. 565). This intellectualistic interpretation of the social bond

is applied even to primitive society: "The primitive organization of the religious community is thus bound together by the necessity of coöperating in religious services, for their mutual advantage and under the belief that this advantage can best be secured by the patronage of the gods" (p. 566). A more convincing suggestion of the nature of the social tie of religious communities is given in the reference to the fact that in primitive society "almost anything may be made a matter of important religious service, in the well-doing and success of which the entire community have an interest, and in some sort, a share," as in kindling a fire, building a boat, or a dwelling, planting and gathering crops, going to war and honoring their heroes. In the treatment of the individuality of religion, its ontological character is still more clearly stated. "It is only in the reality of the living experience of the Individual Self that the Universal and Absolute becomes known and believed in or dimly apprehended as felt" (p. 595). The impression increases throughout the treatment of the subject that the social aspects of religion are taken as phenomenal and that the ontological and metaphysical presuppositions are firmly maintained, without being in the least endangered by a thoroughly genetic and social consideration.

E. S. AMES.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

#### PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS, RACES, PEOPLES.

*A Study of British Genius.* HAVELOCK ELLIS. London, Hurst and Blacklett, 1904. Pp. xiv + 300.

The chief source of data for this interesting book was the Dictionary of National Biography, the sixty-six volumes of which contain biographical accounts of some thirty thousand persons. From this number 1030 persons of preëminent intellectual ability, 975 men and 55 women, were selected by the author to serve as the *corpora vilia* of this study. The material thus made available is presented and discussed under the following heads: Nationality and Race, Social Class, Heredity and Parentage, Childhood and Youth, Marriage and Family, Duration of Life, Pathology, Stature, Pigmentation, and Other Characteristics.

In the chapter on Nationality and Race, which occupies nearly one fourth of the book, the author pursues the problem of localizing the distribution of genius in the larger political divisions of the United Kingdom. In England, for example, three foci of genius-producing localities are discriminated, the East Anglian, the Welsh border, and the southwestern region. North of these lies the Anglo-

Danish district, which although less frequently the origin of genius, is the habitat of peculiar race characteristics, contributing especially the trait of marked independence of thought and action. London, though lying well within the fringe of the east Anglican focus exhibits to an extreme degree deficiency in the production of parents of men of genius. Mr. Ellis presents the novel view that it is not difficult to detect a distinct character in English scientific genius according as it springs from the Anglo-Danish district or the East Anglican focus or the southwest focus. (The Welsh border focus is the home of poetic and artistic types of genius rather than of the scientific type.) "The Anglo-Dane appears to possess an aptitude for mathematics which is not shared by the native of any other English district as a whole, and it is in the exact sciences that the Anglo-Dane triumphs. (The mathematical tendencies of Cambridge are due to the fact that Cambridge drains the ability of nearly the whole Anglo-Danish district.)" (P. 69.) Newton is cited as the supreme figure of Anglo-Danish science. "The East Anglican is in scientific matters drawn to the concrete, and shows little or no mathematical aptitude. He is a natural historian in the widest sense. He delights in the patient collection of facts, and seeks to sift, describe, coördinate, and classify them. In his hands science becomes almost an art." Here belong Gilbert, Ray, and Francis Bacon. The scientific genius of the southwest focus, quite distinct from either of the other two foci, is characterized by a marked interest in mechanics, by the physiological temper, by the inventive turn of mind. Here belong Harvey, Hales, and Thomas Young; also the great scientific physicians, Sydenham and Glisson. Huxley is here the typical figure.

As to the 'social classes' to which the 1,030 belong, Mr. Ellis finds that the ability-producing classes are in direct ratio to their height in the social hierarchy and in inverse ratio to their size. Thus a very large proportion of the list is produced by the comparatively small classes of clergy and those of 'good families,' whereas few are produced by the comparatively large classes of laborers and artisans. The commercial and professional classes occupy a middle ground. "It seems clear that, taking English history as a whole, the conditions of rural life have, from the present point of view, produced the best stocks. The minor aristocracy and the clergy — the 'gentlemen' of England — living on the soil in the open air, in a life of independence at once laborious and leisurely, have been able to give their children good opportunities for development, while at the same time they have not been able to dispense them from the necessity of work" (p. 92).

The chapter on heredity and parentage tends to substantiate the thesis of the well-known work of Galton on *Hereditary Genius*. A considerable number of the 1,030 eminent persons studied are found to have been closely related — 41 groups of two or three individuals in each group, to say nothing of a very large number of instances in which persons in the list were nearly related to others of eminence who had not reached a degree of distinction entitling them to appear in the list. Mr. Ellis estimates roughly that in the case of at least forty per cent. of the entire list of 1,030 one or the other of the parents displayed more than average intellectual ability.

From the standpoint of psychology, particularly individual psychology, the chapter on Childhood and Youth is the most suggestive in the book, on account of the method of interpretation, as well as on account of the data presented. A marked frequency in constitutional delicacy in infancy and early life is noted, followed, however, in many instances by a tendency to become unusually robust or enduring in later life. The subject of precocity is discussed with uncommon discrimination, and the usual gross application of the term meets with deserved rebuke. Although many of those in the list selected were set down by their biographers as precocious (292 out of 1030) and only 44 are mentioned as non-precocious, the term is almost meaningless without further specification. The usual criterion of precocity — preëminence in school work — sometimes also characterizes mediocre minds. Again, many who early became indifferent to school work, because absorbed in their own lines of mental activity are, Mr. Ellis fairly holds, just as 'precocious' as others who seem to enjoy a monopoly of the term. Then there is a small but interesting group of cases whose mental development is first retarded and then accelerated.

In discussing the 'Duration of Life' of men of genius the author briefly punctures the logic of the inference, seemingly based on statistics, arguing longevity. Such an inference leaves out of account the fact that fame comes rather late in life, if it comes at all. Eminent men of genius "live for a long time for the excellent reason that they must live a long time or they will never become eminent."

The reader who half suspects the author of aristocratic leanings is likely to have his suspicions confirmed in the chapter on Pathology, in which the author descants for several pages on the prevalent tendency of gout, that 'disease of good reputation,' to be the most commonly mentioned affliction of the intellectually preëminent. Gout vies with consumption in the pathology of genius. Victims of the latter, "with their febrile activities, their restless versatility, their quick



sensitiveness to impressions, often appear the very type of genius, but it is a somewhat feminine order of genius. The genius of the gouty group is emphatically masculine; profoundly original; these men show a massive and patient energy which proceeds 'without rest,' it may be, but also 'without haste,' until it has dominated its task and solved its problem" (p. 182).

The book as a whole leaves one with the strong impression that the statistical method is not a final method, not a method of conclusions, but a preliminary method, a method of bringing to light new and interesting data, of suggesting, instead of solving, further problems. In the preface Mr. Ellis more than implies that this is but the first in a series of volumes bearing on the psychological and anthropological characteristics of genius and based on material that has been accumulating under his hands for many years.

WILLARD C. GORE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

*The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies.* GEORGE SIMMEL.  
American Journal of Sociology, January, 1906.

The personal unities which we construct out of the data furnished us by the individuals of our social environment are in the nature of the case fragmentary and reveal only a small portion of the real selves. But in so far as our hypothetical personalities react as we expect no necessity arises for a reconstruction based upon a wider synthesis of characteristics. The merchant need only know that his customer is solvent and reliable in a business way. The other contents of his life may well be shrouded in secrecy. In the life of every individual there is a very large content which never appears at all in the social relations, or at best, appears only to one or more individuals. The secret of personality is more or less sociologically restricted, depending upon the relationship. Thus friendship and marriage comprehend a greater content of the personality than a mere business relation.

The secret society seizes upon only those aspects of the personality which are relevant to its purposes. "The organization for a special purpose (Zweckverband) is the peculiarly discreet sociological formation; its members are in psychological respects anonymous; and, in order to form the combination, they need to know of each other only *that* they form it" (p. 449). The justification of secrecy as a social technique for the furtherance of certain specific purposes is not the point at issue for sociological theory. "Secrecy is a universal sociological form, which, as such, has nothing to do with the moral valuation of its contents" (p. 463).

The secret society, in contradistinction to other sociological structures, is a purely purposive and derivative construction, which does not rest upon an instinctive basis. It arises only in a society with evolved methods of conduct. It does not involve a reconstruction of these methods of conduct for the furtherance of the general welfare of society, but rather for the sake of its own particular purposes, which may indeed be quite militant to approved social standards. The secret organization serves to individuate its members or set them over against the rest of society. The psychological motive to secrecy is therefore always an aristocratic or individualistic one. The leaders among primitive peoples shroud themselves in secrecy whereby their authority is accentuated in the popular mind. In modern times secret political and official doings possess much the same glamor for the masses.

Although the secret society seizes upon a fragmentary aspect of the personality of its members, yet it 'commits them to more reciprocal obligations than the same purpose would within an open society' (p. 481). These obligations are psychologically greatly accentuated by the objective technique of an elaborate ritual. The purpose of the secret society may be militant to general social control and, as such, anarchic, but the very inward necessity for a vicarious organization expresses itself here often under the most fantastic forms. Often a centralization of authority takes place within the secret society which goes far beyond that of the outside world. This centralization and absoluteness of power carries with it a de-personalizing tendency. We have indeed what amounts to a merging of personality in the interest and purpose to be subserved — "the object mold has become master over the personal in membership and in activity" (p. 495). "Bismarck speaks in his memoirs of a widely ramified pederastic organization in Berlin, which came under his observation as a young judicial officer; and he emphasizes 'the equalizing effect of coöperative practice of the forbidden vice through all social strata.'" The highest expression of this de-personalizing tendency of secrecy is to be found in irresponsibility. The individual is not personally responsible for his acts so far as they relate to the doings of the organization. Examples of this are to be found in all secret legislation and in the secret work of all sorts of committees. Here the personality is completely merged in an extra-individual motive.

FREDERICK HORNSTEIN.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

*Beitrag zur vergleichenden Rassen-Psychiatrie.* ALEXANDER PILCZ. Leipzig and Vienna, F. Deuticke, 1906. New York, G. E. Stechert & Co. Pp. 44. M. 2.50.

Dr. Pilcz has studied the material from 2886 cases of mental disease at the Vienna Clinic from June 1900 to July 1905, and has added to these a study of the available material concerning mental disease in other than European countries. At Vienna the cases were chiefly from four races — Germans, Northern Slavs (Czechs, Poles, etc.), Hungarians and Jews. The tables show interesting variations in the frequency of the different types of mental disease. Especially striking are the differences in the diseases due to alcoholism. These are by far the more numerous in the north Slavs, followed by Germans and Hungarians. Among the Jews they occur scarcely at all. On the other hand *dementia præcox* is most frequent among the Jews, and the paralytic dementia is nearly as frequent among the Jews as with the Hungarians, who lead in this list. This is true of both men and women. In the cases of paranoia, on the other hand, the Jews lead among the men, but have the smallest percentage among the women. An explanation for the latter the author thinks may possibly be found in the fact that in Jewish women an unusually rapid transition occurs from paranoia to dementia. As to the type of hallucinations, the author ventures only the comparison that the predominantly combining forms seem to be more frequent with the Germans, while the fantastic types with very abundant sense illusions, especially of the 'common feeling,' are more common among the Slavs and Hungarians. Under the head of mania and melancholy the conditions characterized by depression prevail among the Germans of both sexes, as contrasted with those of exaltation; among the Jews and north Slavs this is reversed. The Germans of both sexes lead in cases of depression, while in those of mania they are below the North Slavs and Jews.

In addition to the above, the following general statements are made, based upon the reports of other cases as well as upon the author's own observations:

1. The Scandinavian-Germanic stocks show the greatest tendency toward conditions of depression; suicide is observed most frequently among them.
2. The Jews furnish the greatest contingent for those cases of mental disturbance due to hereditary degeneration.
3. Alcoholism and its attendant mental diseases occur conspicuously among the European peoples. North Slavs and Germans have the preëminence, the Romanic races show more moderation.

Among races outside of Europe alcoholism does not seem to have the same results in psychoses as with Europeans; notably the typical delirium is much less frequent.

4. There are now scarcely any mental disturbances of the hysteric type which appear endemically and epidemically. Such as were formerly known in Europe we now find among the lower races, which seem in general more disposed to hysteria and epilepsy.

5. Progressive paralysis in its frightful frequency is a melancholy specialty of Europe. Outside of Europe it is very infrequent, in spite of the enormous spread of syphilis in many places. That civilization, however, when added as a second factor, is not in itself adequate to account for the European frequency, is shown by the fact that the Japanese have very little paralysis.

*Grundzüge des modernen Seelenlebens in Deutschland.* KARL LAMPRECHT. *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, December, 1905.

The past century and a half may be characterized as a subjectivistic period, as the preceding three centuries may be called the age of individualism. Freedom of the emotional and volitional, as well as of the intellectual life; recognition of individual differences, and of the variety in the individual; reversal of æsthetic standpoint, so that the individual regards himself as subject, not object of æsthetic contemplation, and hence simplifies dress and mode; self-observation and expression in literature, as feeling for nature; interest in man and in psychology and sociology as human sciences; — these are some of the subjectivistic tendencies. The negative or even pathological phases of subjectivism show themselves in discontent and *Weltschmerz*, which are only overcome by a greater self-control, and especially by stronger development of the common social feelings. The subjectivistic personality was the basal element of the new world, but this world must be socially formed if it was to be spiritually free, and open for the mind to traverse. A new friendship, cosmopolitanism, political, social and economic equality of all were some of these new common feelings. Democracy in social spheres has indeed suffered a seeming check in the cry for giant-natures, and a weariness of the *Vielzuvielen*, but this signifies only a transition to a new subjectivism, a new democracy. Nationalism no longer appears in so great a degree the highest thinkable channel of social evolution.

J. H. T.



## BOOKS RECEIVED FROM NOVEMBER 5 TO DECEMBER 5, 1906.

- Essai sur les Passions.* TH. RIBOT. Paris, Alcan, 1907. Pp. xii + 192. Fr. 3.75.
- The Evolution of Knowledge; A Review of Philosophy.* R. ST. J. PERRIN. New York, Baker & Taylor Co., 1905. Pp. xiii + 308.
- Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, N. S., Vol. VI (1905-6).* London, Williams & Norgate, 1906. Pp. 399.
- Le Divin, expériences et hypothèses.* M. HÉBERT. Paris, Alcan, 1907 (for 1906). Pp. 316.
- La vie sociale et l'éducation.* J. DELVAILLE. Paris, Alcan, 1907 (for 1906). Pp. viii + 199.
- La physique de l'Infini.* LÉON MAX. Paris, Lib. Méd. et Scientifique, 1907 (for 1906). Pp. 300.
- Psicología moderna.* E. GOMEZ Y PLANOS. Santiago de Cuba, Imp. Ilust. Cubana, 1906. Pp. 49.
- Le langage musical et ses troubles hystériques.* Paris, Alcan, 1907 (for 1906). Pp. vi + 208.
- Idealistic Construction of Experience.* J. B. BAILLIE. London and New York, Macmillans, 1906. Pp. xx + 344.
- Savage Childhood, a Study of Kafir Children.* D. KIDD. Profusely illustrated. London, Black, 1906. Pp. 314.

## NOTES AND NEWS.

THE American Psychological Association will meet, in affiliation with the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Society of Naturalists, at Columbia University, New York City, on December 27 to 29. The American Philosophical Association will meet at the same time and place and participate in the same affiliation.

THE second meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology will be held in Montgomery, Alabama, in connection with the Southern Educational Association, on December 27 to 29. Those expecting to be present are requested to communicate with the Secretary, Professor E. F. Buchner, University, Ala.

WE have received the announcement of a new journal, *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, to be edited by a 'group of Dominican professors,' and published quarterly by the *Revue*, Le Saulchoir, à Kain, Belgium (fr. 12; postal union fr. 14).

THE Science Press announces that hereafter the series known as *Archives of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* will be conducted as two series, to be known as *Archives of Philosophy* and *Archives of Psychology*. The latter will be under the editorial direction of Professor R. S. Woodworth, of Columbia University.

WE regret to note the death of Professor Carlo Cantoni, of the University of Pavia, founder and editor of the *Rivista Filosofica*. It is announced that Professor E. Juvalta will conduct the *Rivista* till the completion of the current volume.

MR. C. F. SANDERS has been appointed instructor in psychology at Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, Pa.

The following are taken from the press :

PROFESSOR E. H. SNEATH has been granted a second year's leave of absence from Yale University. Dr. Paul Monroe, professor of the history of education at Teachers College, Columbia University, will have charge of one of his courses.

CHAS. HUGHES JOHNSON, Ph.D. (Harvard), last year professor of psychology at East Stroudsburg State Normal School, is now instructor in philosophy and psychology at Dartmouth College. Some psychological apparatus is being secured for the college, which, it is hoped, may form the nucleus for a psychological laboratory in the near future.

DR. JOHN FREDERICK SHEPARD, formerly assistant in psychology at the University of Michigan, has been promoted to be an instructor.

DR. SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ, pathological physiologist at the McLean Hospital, Waverly, Mass., has been appointed professor of physiology at George Washington University.

IN the early part of October the Yale Association of Japan gave a reception in honor of Professor G. T. Ladd, who is now in Tokyo.

THE fiftieth anniversary of the induction of Emeritus Professor Campbell Fraser to the chair of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh was celebrated on November 6. Addresses were presented to Professor Fraser, who is now in his 88th year, by the Senatus and by his former honors graduates.

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